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ASSUMED RISK UNDER THE FEDERAL EMPLOY-
ERS' LIABILITY ACT
JOHN D. WELMAN*
Two section men engaged in interstate commerce are carry-
ing a tie and one negligently drops his end and injures the other.
Or, two engine wipers are wiping an engine engaged in interstate
commerce and one negligently wipes dust into the eye of the
other and injures it.
Query 1. Does the Federal Employers' Liability Act create a
liability against the railway company for such negligence?
Query 2. If that act creates a liability, does it also create a
defense, or permit the defense of assumed risk to remain so as to
be a complete bar to the liability or right of action created?
Congress determined to have uniform rights of action for
the injury and death of the employees of railroad carriers
engaged in interstate commerce, and had exclusive jurisdic-
tion when it concluded to cover that field. The United States
had no death statute, nor any common law covering those
matters. It had no common law at all. It was therefore neces-
sary to create a right of action for an injury as well as for a
death, and this it could do only by a statute. Both rights of
action would have to be statutory. This it did and made "negli-
gence the requisite or basis of each action."1
See biographical note, p. 379.
1 Justice Pitney in Seaboard Co. v. Horton, 233 U. S. 492, 501, 58 L. ed.
1062 (1913), calls it the ?ight of action, and that it is created by the first
section of the act.
"By its first section a right of action is conferred (under the conditions
specified) for injury or death of the employee resulting in whole or in part
from the negligence of any of the officers, agents, or employees of such
carrier, etc."
Again he says as to this clause (233 U. S. 492, 501):
"The one covering the negligence of any of the officers, agents, or em-
ployees of the carrier, which has the effect of abolishing in this class of
cases the common law rule that exempted the employer from responsibility
for the negligence of a fellow employee or plaintiff."
In Chicago R. Co. v. Ward, 252 U. S. 18, 22, 64 L. ed. 430 (1919), in
speaking of the act (without specific reference to Section 1 creating the
liability), Justice Day says:
"The Federal Employers' Liability Act places a co-employee's negli-
gence, when it is the ground of the action, in the same relation as that of
the employer upon the matter of the assumption of risk."
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As there had been and were certain complete defenses to the
common law action for a negligent injury, Congress undertook
and did deal with those defenses in Sections 3 and 4. Con-
tributory negligence had been a full defense under the common
law. Section 3 provides that it shall not be a full defense or
bar a recovery, but only diminish the damages and further that
there can be no contributory negligence where the violation of
a safety appliance act caused or contributed to the cause of the
injury.2
The other important defense Congress put in section 4 as
follows:
"* * * such employee shall not be held to have assumed the risks
of his employment in any case where the violation by such common carrier
of any statute enacted for the safety of employees contributed to the
injury or death of such employee."3
Congress thereby eliminated only one item from the common
law assumption of risks. The Supreme Court says in the Sea-
board-Horton case :4
"that in all other cases such assumption of risk shall have its
former effect as a complete bar to the action."
"Bar to the action"-What action is the Supreme Court talking
about? The right of action created by Section 1.5 The class of
risks assumed are not mentioned or distinguished in Section 4,
but they are those assumed under the common law. The Su-
2 "In all actions hereafter brought against any such common carrier by
railroad under or by virtue of any of the provisions of this act to recover
damages for personal injuries to an employee, or where such injuries have
resulted in his death, the fact that the employee may have been guilty of
contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery, but the damages shall
be diminished by the jury in proportion to the amount of negligence attrib-
utable to such employee. Provided, that no such employee who may be
injured or killed shall be held to have been guilty of contributory negligence
in any case where the violation by such common carrier of any statute
enacted for the safety of employees contributed to the injury or death of
such employee (35 Stat. 66)." (Act April 22, 1908, c. 149, sec. 3.)
3 "In an action brought against any common carrier under or by virtue
of any of the provisions of this act to recover damages for injuries to, or
the death of, any of its employees, such employee shall not be held to have
assumed the risks of his employment in any case where the violation by
such common carrier of any statute enacted for the safety of employees con-
tributed to the injury or death of such employee (35 Stat. 66)." (Act April
22, 1908, c. 149, sec. 4.)
4233 U. S. 492, 503 (1913).
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preme Court says that it is evident that the legislative intent
of Congress was to keep alive or enact all other assumed risks
as defenses. One of the other assumed risks thus kept alive,
and as a complete bar to the action is, that an employee as-
sumed the risk of the negligence of his fellow-servant (not a
vice-principal).
But section 1 creates a liability for the negligence of a fellow-
servant "any employee". How, then, can it be that Section 4
can frame a complete defense to that liability? Why create a
liability for the negligence of any employee if it is to be offset or
nullified by creating a complete defense in a subsequent section
of the same act? Is it possible that a complaint, petition or
declaration might aver a good cause of action under Section 1
of the Act, and the facts stated be admitted as absolutely true,
and yet there can be a complete bar and defense to the action
under section 4? Why build the right of action only to be torn
down?
Under the commerce clause of the constitution Congress has
exclusive jurisdiction over interstate commerce when it enters
that field of legislation. Having determined so to do, it had to
adopt a statutory right of action and exclude all common law
actions as well as statutory actions in the various states. The
common law of the various states did not give a right of action
for an injury caused by the negligence of a fellow-servant (not
vice-principal). That is a general statement. In some states
it seems there was an action for negligence of a fellow servant,
but that the plaintiff assumed the risk of such negligence was a
pure defense. In Indiana plaintiff had to plead, and therefore
prove, that he did not assume the risk. That burden was on
plaintiff in some other states, while in Federal Courts assumed
risk has been regarded as pure defense. A similar situation
prevailed as to contributory negligence. It required a statute
in Indiana to put the burden of proving contributory negli-
gence upon the defendant. And that burden now upon the
G "Every common carrier by railroad while engaging in commerce be-
tween any of the several States or Territories, or between any of the States
and Territories, or between the District of Columbia and any of the States
or Territories, or between the District of Columbia or any of the States
or Territories and any foreign nation or nations, shall be liable in damages
to any person suffering injury while he is employed by such carrier in such
commerce, or, in case of the death of such employee, to his or her personal
representative, for the benefit of the surviving widow or husband and
children of such employee; and, if none, then of such employee's parents,
and, if none, then of the next of kin dependent upon such employee, for
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defendant applies only in personal injury and death. As to
property that burden in Indiana is still upon the plaintiff. The
Federal Court sitting in Indiana has always regarded contribu-
tory negligence and assumed risk as defenses and burdens upon
defendant.
The courts of many states called certain fellow servants "vice-
principals" and thereby created a liability for his negligence, or
at least did not permit the defense of assumed risk until knowl-
edge of the danger. The legislatures of many states passed acts
creating a liability for negligence of certain servants for which
there was no liability under the common law on account of as-
sumed risk. In many states there were but few fellow servants
left. Other state acts destroyed in toto contributory negligence
or assumed risk, or both as defenses. Most of the states had
passed Compensation Acts creating a liability for every injury
and without regard to negligence. The doctrine of last clear
chance prevailed in most courts and to grant recovery under
such doctrine either destroyed or excused contributory negli-
gence. Some states had statutes creating presumptions of neg-
ligence when struck by a car or engine.
Out of all of this chaos Congress had to create a statutory
right of action. Why then should not Congress in the most
practical manner create a right of action creating liability for
the negligence of any and every employee of the carrier, and then
in the same act take care of the former defenses as it saw best
to do? Congress had to create a statutory right of action. It
therefore had to create a statutory defense. Otherwise there
vould have been no defense, unless there were no negligence.
And where negligence existed, there would be no defense what-
ever.
Would it be strange to say that there can be no last clear
chance under the Federal Act? Under last clear chance contrib-
utory negligence of the plaintiff "vanishes", "disappears", or is
"excused" before the special duty or last clear chance arises.
Under the Federal Act when contributory negligence is present
it remains so for the purpose of diminishing damages. Last
clear chance and contributory negligence can not exist at the
same time.
such injury or death resulting in whole or in part from the negligence of
any of the officers, agents, or employees of such carrier, or by reason of
any defect or insufficiency, due to its negligence, in its cars, engines, appli-
ances, machinery, track, roadbed, works, boats, wharves, or other equip-
ment (35 Stat. 65)." (Act April 22, 1908, c. 149, see. 1.)
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Under the Federal Act, does a servant assume the risk of the
negligence of his fellow servant? Or is the law on that question
the same since the Federal Act was passed as it was before it
was passed? By "fellow-servant" is meant those of the same
grade as distinguished from a vice-principal or a servant per-
forming some duty of the master, or duty upon the master fixed
by law that he could not delegate to a servant. The common law
of Indiana is well settled. 6
In passing upon the Federal Act the Supreme Court says in
Seatboard v. Horton :7
6 "When the contract of service is entered into the master impliedly
contracts that he will exercise ordinary care in the selection and retention
of employee's co-servants, and such employee impliedly contracts that, this
requirement complied with, he will assume the risks of the service, the
perils of injury from the negligence of such co-servants." Southern Indiana
R. Co. v. Harrell, 161 Ind. 689, 695 (1903).
The common law of the Federal Courts is well put in Central R. Co. V.
Keegan, 160 U. S. 259, 264, 40 L. ed. 418 (1895).
"It was further declared that 'the danger from the negligence of one
specially in charge of the particular work was as obvious and as great as
from that of those who were simply co-workers with him in it; each is
equally with the other an ordinary risk of the employment, which the em-
ployee assumes when entering upon the employment, whether the risk be
obvious or not. It was laid down that the rightful test to determine whether
the negligence complained of was an ordinary risk of the employment was
whether the negligent act constituted a breach of positive duty owing by
the master, such as that of taking fair and reasonable precautions to sur-
round his employee with fit and careful co-workers, and the furnishing to
such employee of a reasonably safe place to work and reasonably safe tools
or machinery with which to do the work, thus making the question of
liability of an employer for an injury to his employee turn rather on the
character of the alleged negligent act than on the relations of the em-
ployees to each other, so that if the act is one done in the discharge of
some positive duty of the master to the servant, then negligence in the act
is the negligence of the master; but if it be not one in the discharge of
such positive duty, then there should be some personal wrong on the part
of the employer before he is liable therefor. * * *
"He therefore makes his contract of service in contemplation of the
risk of injury from the negligence of a boss or foreman, as well as from
the negligence of another fellow-workman. The foreman or superior serv-
ant stands to him, in that respect, in the precise- position of his other
fellow-servants."
7 In the lower court the allegation of negligence is "negligence of the
defendant company in that the engineman and fireman (the employees
of the latter in operating a train which ran down and killed decedent)
failed to keep a reasonable lookout for decedent just before he was killed."
The evidence showed that neither the engineer nor fireman was keeping
a lookout; that if they had done so the accident could have been averted.
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"Some employments are necessarily fraught with danger to the work-
men,-danger that must be and is confronted in a line of his duty. Such
dangers as are normally and necessarily incident to the occupation are pre-
sumably taken into account in fixing wages. And a workman of mature
years is taken to assume the risk of this sort, whether he is actually aware
of them or not.
"But risks of another sort, not naturally incident to the occupation, may
arise out of the failure of the employer to exercise due care with respect
to providing a safe place to work and suitable and safe appliances for the
work. These the employee is not treated as assuming until he becomes
aware of the defect or dis-repair and of the risk arising from it, unless
the defect and risk alike are so obvious that an ordinarily prudent person
under the circumstances would have discovered them and appreciated them.
These distinctions have been recognized and applied in numerous decisions
of this court."
Is it not clear that all servants assume the risks of the dan-
gers of the "occupation" or "employment"? The risks of the
occupation are assumed whether the servant has knowledge of
them or not, "But risks of another sort" (not of the occupation
and arising from the negligence of the master are not assumed
until the servant has actual or constructive knowledge. The same
principles are announced in C. & 0. v. DeAtley, supra.
The Supreme Court of Virginia held that as decedent was given permission
to be where he was the company owed him a duty to keep a reasonable
lookout, and that the ignorance of the engineer and fireman of decedent's
presence was no defense. Decedent was a track inspector using a three-
wheel velocipede in his line of duty. Although more than ninety per cent
of writs of certiorari are denied, it was granted in this case, and for a
particular purpose, perhaps.
Justice Holmes says:
"The deceased was an experienced section foreman upon defendant's
road. One of his duties was to go over and examine the track and to keep
it in proper rela'r. When inspect:ng the track he used a three-wheeled
velocipedle that fitted the rails and was propelled by the feet of the user.
He had obtained from his immediate superior, the supervisor of track, leave
to use the machine also in going to his work from his house, about a mile
distant, over a part of the track that was in his charge. His work began
at seven in the morning and at half past six on the day of his death he
started as usual. Five minutes later he was overtaken by a train and
killed. For reasons that the jury found insufficient to excuse the omis-
sions the engineer and fireman of the train were not on the lookout, and
the question raised is whether as toward the deceased the defendant owed
a duty to keep a lookout or whether on the other hand the deceased took the
risk.
"If the accident had happened an hour later when the deceased was
inspecting the track, we think there is no doubt that he would be held to
have assumed the risk, and to have understood, as he instructed his men,
that he must rely upon his own watchfulness and keep out of the way."
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The assumed risk of the occupation is a complete bar to the
right of action. The risks caused by the negligence of the master
is a complete bar if they have been discovered and appreciated
by the servant.
What is the risk of the "occupation" which is always as-
sumed? Does that include the two servants carrying a tie or
wiping an engine? Under the common law the duty of the mas-
ter was to exercise ordinary care in furnishing a reasonably safe
place for work. Even then some employments were necessarily
fraught with more danger to workman than other employments.
His further duty was to exercise ordinary care in the selection
and retention of his servants. The master impliedly contracted
with his servant to exercise such care and the servant im-
pliedly contracted to assume the risks of the place, and the risks
of the negligence of the co-servants selected by the exercise of
ordinary care. A servant did not assume the negligence of an-
other servant not selected by ordinary care, or of an incom-
petent one until after such incompetency was known. There
was always a liability for the failure of the master to exercise
ordinary care either in the selection and retention of his co-
servants, or in furnishing a reasonably safe place to work.
Therefore, the Risk of the Occupation covers only the business
and place furnished by the master in the exercise of ordinary
care together with the servants selected and retained by such
care.
This is a fair statement of the rule, and the Federal Courts,
as well as most others, adopted the fellow servant rule of the
Farwell v. Boston case, 4 Metc. 49, whereby the servant impliedly
contracted to assume the risks of the service or employment,
including the negligence of his fellow-servant in the same em-
ployment. The servants charged with the master's duty were
not fellow servants. They were generally known in the law as
vice-principals.
Carrying in mind the fact that the risks of the occupation
are assumed, whether the servant was aware of them or not, it
is plain that there was no liability for the negligence of a ser-
vant although the injured servant had no knowledge of such
negligence, or no opportunity of knowing of such negligence
before the injury.
As against this statement of the law there is apparent con-
flict. Justice Pitney in C. & 0. v. DeAtley, in speaking of section
1 says that section
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"abrogated the common law rule known as the fellow servant doctrine
by placing the negligence of a co-employee upon the same basis as the
negligence of the employer. At the same time, in saving the defense of
assumption of risk * * * *, the act placed a co-employee's negligence,
where it is the ground of the action, in the same relation as the employers
own negligence would stand to the question whether a plaintiff is to be
deemed to have assumed the risk."8
As to the master's negligence assumed risk is not a bar until
the servant has actual or constructive notice of such. The facts
in that case show that Justice Pitney was dealing with the neg-
ligence of an engineer (a vice-principal) who controlled the
speed of the train and had authority to order and control
DeAtley's movements. Was Justice Pitney dealing only with
the facts in that case, or was he intentionally saying in effect
that when a section man negligently drops his end of the tie and
injures the man carrying the other end, that the dropping of
the tie is the negligence of the master? In such instance there
could be no knowledge of such negligent dropping until after
the happening and therefore no assumption of risk, and there-
fore no defense. It should be noted, that in our opinion, all of
the cases of liability so far decided by the Supreme Court in-
volved the question of a vice-principal, for whose negligence
there is a liability under the principles of the commonlaw (used
in construing the Federal Act), where assumed risk does not
arise until there is knowledge. Was Justice Pitney intentionally
destroying the assumption of the risk of a fellow servant's neg-
ligence as applied in the risk of "occupation" and broadly say-
ing the negligence of no servant is assumed until there is knowl-
edge? In his opinion in the Seaboard-Horton case Justice Pit-
ney recognizes the risks of "employments" and then says,--
"But risks of another sort * * * may arise out of the failure
of the employer to exercise due care with respect to providing
a safe place to work and safe appliances for the work." This
division of risks is somewhat strange as the "place" was always
included in the risk of the employment, and when the master
had exercised due care to furnish the place he was not, and
could not, be said to be negligent. After such due care the ser-
vant assumed the dangers-the dangers existing after due care
had been exercised by the master in furnishing the place.
But it might seem that Justice Pitney's holding is to the effect
that the risk of no employee's negligence (a purely fellow ser-
vant as well as a vice-principal) is assumed, until and after
8 241 U. S. 310, 313. (1915).
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there is knowledge of such negligence. This is the phase of the
question that gives us most concern. It seems that this ques-
tion is clarified by the later decision and that a servant assumes
the risk of the negligence of his fellow servant (not vice-
principal) whether he is aware of such negligence or not.
The later case is that of C. & 0. Ry. Co. v. Nixon.9 This case
holds that decedent assumed the risk. The last sentence of the
opinion repeats it by saying,-
"It seems to us to have been no more than an extension of his ordinary
rights and his usual risks."
As to whether the company owed deceased the duty to keep
a lookout the opinion makes this brief reference,--
"The duty of the railroad company toward this class of employees was
not affected by that which it might owe to others."
This case was reversed on the assumption of risk. In this
case the engineer and fireman were not on the lookout although
we know section men may be found any place along the track.
Their negligence was the "ground" of the action below. Did
deceased assume the risk of their negligence? What was the
risk assumed that made a complete bar to the action? Suppose
they had seen deceased upon the track and negligently (not
wilfully) killed him? Would that have been any greater action-
able negligence than the failure not to see him at all? If they
or the company owed deceased no duty, then no liability could
exist except for wilful injury. A railroad company must oper-
ate its train with ordinary care knowing that some of its ser-
vants will be on or near the track. It must be on the lookout
for third persons, or the public, at street crossings, and use due
care under the circumstances. Did deceased assume the risk of
the occupation in this case? That is the risk that trains would
pass at any time. Did that risk of occupation include also the
further risk that the engineer would not always be looking? Is
the glass in the front of the cab for the only purpose of looking
out for the public, or obstructions on the track, or visible sig-
nals? This seems to indicate that the deceased assumed the risk
of the negligence of the engineer and fireman-the risk of the
occupation including the negligence of the men on the engine.
It had to be the risk of the occupation of employment, or the risk
of the negligence of the engineman, or both. The Virginia courts
held the company liable for its negligence through the failure
of the servants on the engine to keep a reasonable lookout-
primarily the negligence of the servants. To correct this mis-
9 271 U. S. 218. (1925).
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take certiorari was granted and liability was denied because
deceased assumed the risk of the act or omission that caused his
death. It can not be said that this case went off on the theory
that defendant owed deceased no duty. If that were so then
there it would have been said that there was no negligence on
the part of the company or the engineer for failure to keep a
lookout. If there was no such negligence then there would have
been no occasion to say that the action was barred because
there was no duty, no right of action. Yet when the Company
used ordinary care in the operation of its railroad and the same
care in the selection and retention of its engineer and fireman,
the deceased contracted to assume the risks of the negligence
of its servants other than vice-principals. This case was not
reviewed for the purpose of holding that no duty was owed
Nixon. If there was no duty to keep a lookout plaintiff's cause
of action would have failed and there would have been no occa-
sion to speak of assumed risk, and that the cause of his death
was assumed.
Extremely interesting along this line is the recent case of
Pachelo v. N. Y., N. Y. & H. R. R. Co.10 There plaintiff was en-
gaged, pursuant to orders, in spreading dirt over the roadbed
in a railroad yard. He was struck by a cut of cars with engine
attached backing down upon him, and which for some time
previous had stood about four hundred feet away. Just beyond
him the track was crossed by a highway. There was no one on
the rear of the cars to warn him. Neither did the switch engine
ring the bell before starting, or before crossing the highway.
The railroad company had a rule that old engines must ring the
bell when "about to move" and also ring "on approaching a
highway."
The district court dismissed the case at the close of all the
evidence on the ground that the plaintiff had assumed the
risk of such an accident.
The Circuit Court of Appeals said:
"Except for the two rules mentioned above, the case would clearly fall
within Aerkfetz v. Humphreys, 145 U. S. 418, 36 L. ed. 758; Boldt v. Penn.
R. R. Co., 245 U. S. 441, 62 L. ed. 385, and C. & 0. Ry. Co. v. Nixon, Admx.,
decided May 24, 1926. Apparently among the risks assumed is that of
the inattention of other employees, in train movements. C. & 0. Ry. Co. v.
Nixon was decided under the Federal Employers Liability Act and ex-
pressly reaffirmed Aerkfetz v. Humphreys; it is, of course, controlling."
"A number of decisions in the Circuit Courts of Appeal under the Em-
ployers Liability Act have, however, created an exception to the ruling in
10 15 Fed. (2nd) 467. (1926)
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Aerkfetz v. Humphreys, when the plaintiff's fellow servants have failed
to observe a rule or practice established by it for the protection of its em-
ployees. Lehigh Valley R. R. v. Mongan, 279 F. 85; Director General v.
Templin, 268 F. 483; L. V. R. R. v. Doktor, 290 F. 760; Toledo R. Co, v.
Bartley, 172 F. 82; B. & 0. R. Co. v. Robertson, 300 F. 314; St. L. & S. Ry.
v. Jeffries, 276 F. 73. * * *
"Just what is the ground of the distinction is not altogether apparent,
though there would seem to be more warrant for supposing that one's
fellow will observe an express rule or practice for specific action in a
particular situation than that they will be uniformly attentive. Possibly
it has arisen merely from a disposition to relax the severity of the rule."
There we have a judicial estimate of the C. & 0. v. Dixon case,
and the latter holds, "among the risks assumed is that of the
inattention of other employees in train movements." What is
this inattention other than plain negligence of employees? And
the negligence assumed is one of the risks of the employment
or occupation.
That the violation of a rule is such negligence as is not as-
sumed may be said to be the negligence of the master; that the
employee in ringing the bell is performing a duty of the master,
that in failing to ring, the violation is that of the master; that
the person so failing is a vice-principal and not a fellow
servant.
In the Nixon case the Virginia courts held the company owed
a duty to keep a reasonable lookout for him and the negligent
failure of the enginemen so to do was the negligence of the com-
pany, respondeat superior. (1) That duty was imposed by
law. (2) There was a violation of the duty imposed. (3) An
injury proximately caused by such violation of duty. The Su-
preme Court did not say the major premise of that right of
action was false. It may have hinted in that direction, but it
defeated that right of action by the defense of assumed risk.
Otherwise assumed risk was sheer surplusage in that opinion,
and should not have been made predominating.
In the DeAtley case Justice Pitney says,-
"At the same time in saving the defense of assumed risk * * * the
act placed a co-employee's negligence, where it is the ground of the action,
in the same relation as the employer's own negligence would stand to the
question whether a plaintiff is to be deemed to have assumed the risk."
It is obvious, then, in an action grounded upon a co-employee's
negligence, that in making a defense to such action that plaintiff
assumed the risk of the negligence pleaded, such negligence must
be treated as or called the negligence of the master. The act
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"placed" or made the employee's negligence that of the master
"in saving the defense of the assumed risk." Necessity required
the creation of this arbitrary right of action. The United States
as such had no common law. Congress had to create an entirely
new and statutory right of action-an arbitrary one. It wanted
to create a liability against interstate carriers. As it had no
common law, it had to start by making a liability for the neg-
ligence of every and "any" employee of the carrier. It had no
respondeat superior and therefore it made a liability of the car-
rier direct for the negligence of any employee. Thus the lia-
bility, the right of action, was necessarily an arbitrary one.
Section 1 is as broad and arbitrary upon negligence as any Com-
pensation Act without negligence. To create the defense of as-
sumed risk Section 4 was just as necessary, and it kept alive
all the defenses of assumed risk except the violation of safety
appliance acts. Therefore, assumed risk is applied to the negli-
gence of the master arbitrarily instead of to the negligence of the
co-employee. Yet practically it amounts to the same thing.
If it be said that the master's negligence is assumed only
when known and appreciated, may not that be very true but not
exclusively so? Does that necessarily exclude the negligence of
a fellow servant assumed in the risk of the employment? As
the liability for the negligence of any employee was arbitrarily
(or even if otherwise) created as aforesaid why may not the de-
fenses to such negligence remain? The Nixon case is the last
expression on that question. The evidence in that case and be-
fore the Supreme Court showed that neither the engineer nor
fireman saw Nixon although there was a long distance of straight
track ahead. Neither did Nixon see the train behind him. No
one saw Nixon. There was no time for Nixon, under the evi-
dence, to know and appreciate his danger. The master's neg-
ligence there was that of the men on the engine. The engineer's
negligence that of the master. Nixon was not charged with
contributory negligence. Neither is it said that his negligence
was the proximate cause of his death. He assumed the risk.
View that case from any point, the defense of assumed risk de-
feated the action-there was no failure of proof. There is no
dissenting opinion in that case. He never knew what killed him
but he assumed the risk-the inattention or negligence of co-
employees in propelling a train. He had engaged in a dangerous
employment. The master was presumed to have used due care
in the selection and retention of its employees and the same care
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furnishing the place and yet it was dangerous on account of the
inattention or negligence of co-employees.
Congress made negligence the basis of the action and as a
general rule Federal Courts have reserved to themselves the au-
thority and right to determine what is such negligence under
the common law rules. Sometimes even our Supreme Court has
left that matter to a jury and two state courts to decide,
thereby destroying uniformity or making possible different
standards of negligence in different jurisdictions under similar
circumstances. So also have Federal Courts determined the
risks assumed under Section 4, by applying the common law
rules.
The Federal cases including those of the Supreme Court would
indicate that Sections 1 and 4 of the Federal Employers Liability
Act did not change to a great extent the common law upon the
questions involved in said sections, that is, the common law as
promulgated by Federal Courts previous to its enactment. This
is manifest for the reason that Congress had to cover the entire
field of negligence and assumed risk by a statutory right of action
and a statutory defense. The common law rules of negligence
and assumed risk under the statute as now interpreted are prac-
tically those formerly existing.
What then will the Supreme Court say when a section man
drops his end of the tie, or an engine wiper throws dust into
another wiper's eyes? Under the doctrine of the Nixon case
and the Pacheco case will it not say there is no liability, that
assumed risk prevents a recovery?
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